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Abstract: 
Theoretical and empirical research has shown that a sound and effective financial system is 
critical for economic development and growth.  The financial system, however, is also 
subject to boom and bust cycles and fragility, with negative repercussions for the real 
economy.  Further, the political structure of societies, often pre-determined by historic 
experience, is critical for the structure and development of the financial system.  This paper is 
a critical survey of three related strands of literature – the finance and growth literature, the 
literature on financial fragility, and the politics and finance literature.  
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1. Introduction 
What role does finance have in the development of market-based economies? Early on, 
politicians and economists alike emphasized the importance of the financial system for the 
rise of capitalism, industrialization, and economic development. Smith (1776) pointed to the 
role of money in lowering transaction costs, thus permitting greater specialization, and 
fostering technological innovation. Alexander Hamilton (1781), one of the founding fathers 
of the United States, argued that “banks were the happiest engines that ever were invented” 
for spurring economic growth. Joseph Schumpeter argued in 1911 that financial 
intermediaries play a pivotal role in economic development because they choose which firms 
get to use society’s savings.1
The same mechanisms that underpin the positive role of finance, however, are also a 
source of risk and fragility. The history of finance is full of boom-and-bust cycles, bank 
failures, and systemic bank and currency crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Just as there is a 
comprehensive literature on the impact of finance on growth, there is an equally important 
 On the other hand, development economists for many decades 
have ignored the financial system and focused on other policy areas. Lucas (1988) described 
the role of finance in the growth process as overstated, and Robinson (1952) argued that 
financial development primarily follows economic growth. Following the seminal works by 
Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973), however, a large and still active 
theoretical and empirical literature has related financial development to the economic growth 
process. Empirical studies have found a positive impact of financial deepening on economic 
growth, statistically and economically significant. More recently, studies have related the 
development of the financial sector to other real sector outcomes, including the pattern of 
countries’ trade balance and changes in income distribution and poverty levels. 
                                                          
1 See Schumpeter (1934). The author is grateful to Ross Levine for sharing many of the historic references. 
 
literature that has explored the causes and socioeconomic costs of financial fragility, 
including systemic banking crises. Historic analyses and case studies have given way to more 
systemic cross-country explorations of idiosyncratic and systemic banking distress and their 
determinants. 
Given the importance of finance for growth, its inherent risks, and the large 
socioeconomic costs of banking crises, it is not surprising that the financial sector is often at 
the top of the policy agenda. However, the importance of access to credit as entry barrier into 
the real sector and the relative ease with which owners and creditors of financial institutions 
can be expropriated also makes financial sector policies an important tool in the political 
process. Subsidized credit programs and credit guarantees are often an easy and cheap tool of 
fiscal policy as they create contingent rather than real liabilities. The dependence of most real 
sector enterprises on access to external finance makes the financial sector critical in the 
attempt of ruling elites to entrench their socioeconomic dominance and prevent entry of 
competitors. The reliance of financial institutions and markets on contractual institutions 
makes them dependent on the political sphere. 
The recent crisis has brought these issues to the forefront of the academic and also 
political debate. The crisis has also shed doubt on the previous findings of a positive impact 
of finance on growth. How much finance is good for growth? Are financial crises too high a 
price for having a thriving financial system? Are credit boom-and-bust cycles behind 
economic cycles? What is the politics behind financial development and fragility? 
This paper explores the role of the financial sector for economic growth, the causes 
and consequences of financial fragility, and the politics behind financial deepening and 
fragility. In doing so, I identify the critical role of the financial sector within capitalist 
economies, a role with bright and dark sides. Specifically, I survey the large theoretical and 
 
empirical literature that links a sound financial system to the process of economic 
development. I discuss the theoretical and empirical literature on bank fragility and banking 
crises and survey the literature on the political economy of financial deepening. Importantly, 
I relate these three strands of the literature to each other and to the current crisis. 
Financial institutions and markets depend critically on contractual institutions, and 
this survey is thus closely related to the institutions and development literature (Acemgolu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2005). Specifically, given the intertemporal nature of financial 
contracts, the financial system is one of the most institution-sensitive sectors of the economy. 
The financial sector depends as much as contractual institutions on property rights protection 
and thus the political structures of societies. 
This paper is related to other recent surveys. Levine (2005) surveys the theoretical and 
empirical literature on finance and growth, and Beck (2009) surveys the econometric 
methodologies behind the empirical finance and growth literature. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2005) discuss the literature on banking crises, and Haber and Perrotti (2008) 
offer a critical survey of the finance and politics literature. This survey is also related to 
recent surveys on the political economy of the financial and legal system (Beck and Levine, 
2005). Compared to these previous surveys, this paper tries to bring these three literatures 
together and relate them to the first global financial crisis of the twenty-first century. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the 
theoretical and empirical finance and growth literature. Then I discuss the theoretical and 
empirical literature on financial fragility. Following that is a survey of the political economy 




2. Finance and Economic Development 
What role does the financial sector play in market economies? How important is the financial 
sector in the growth process of countries? Over the past thirty years, a flourishing theoretical 
literature has explained the endogenous emergence of financial institutions and markets and 
has explored their impact on real sector outcomes, including economic growth and income 
inequality. Over the past twenty years, a still growing empirical literature has explored the 
effect of financial systems and their different segments on economic growth and other real 
sector variables. This literature has also explored the relative importance of banks and 
markets and the impact of financial sector development on other real sector outcomes. More 
recently, this literature has explored the distributional repercussions of financial deepening 
and the effect of broadening. I discuss each in turn. 
 
2.1. Finance and Growth: Theory 
The theoretical literature on financial intermediation has focused on two important 
dimensions. Why do financial markets and institutions exist? And what is their impact on 
savings, investment, and economic growth? I discuss each question in turn. 
At the core of the existence of financial institutions and markets are market frictions, 
which financial institutions and markets can help alleviate, such as asymmetric information 
between contractual partners resulting in agency problems and risks of illiquidity and default. 
Building on the insights by Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) on the importance of agency problems, 
several articles have shown how financial institutions and markets can economize on 
screening and monitoring costs of many individual lenders and, by diversifying risk across 
many different projects, improve on a world without them.2
                                                          
2 See Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986), among many others. 
 By pooling savings across a large 
 
number of savers with differently timed liquidity needs, financial institutions can help 
overcome liquidity risks and ultimately provide savers with a higher return. Similarly, more 
liquid financial markets increase incentives for investors to relinquish control over their 
savings, as they are able to access them through financial markets on an immediate basis, 
while at the same time earning higher returns. The emergence of financial institutions and 
markets can thus be explained by the gains for economic agents, a theoretical argument that is 
consistent with the historical observance that financial institutions and markets have arisen at 
an early stage of human history and especially as exchange of goods and services across 
larger geographical distances and within larger societies or between societies has become 
more prominent.3
The endogenous emergence of financial institutions and markets does not in itself 
imply a positive impact on economic growth. A large theoretical literature, however, has 
explored several channels through which financial systems can help increase economic 
growth rates, both through improved capital accumulation as through higher productivity 
growth. On a broader level, these theories have shown how financial markets can help 
overcome the market frictions of indivisible projects and inability to diversify risks that have 
held back development in many developing economies (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). I 
discuss these different channels in turn. 
 
First, and on a very basic level, financial systems can support the efficient exchange 
of goods and services by providing payment services and thus reducing transaction costs. 
Financial services can foster specialization by enabling more transactions, thus fostering 
productivity growth.4
                                                          
3 For a discussion of the role of the shareholding company in Rome, see Malmendier (2009). For a discussion on 
the role of different financial contracts to finance trade across the Mediterranean, see, for example, Williamson 
(2010) and the literature quoted therein. 
 
4 See, for example, Greenwood and Smith (1997). 
 
Second, by pooling savings from many individual savers, financial institutions and 
markets can help overcome investment indivisibilities and allow exploiting scale economies.5 
This does not necessarily have to be national financial institutions but can be local coalitions 
of investors, as was the case in the early days of the Industrial Revolution for infrastructure 
projects.6
Third, by economizing on screening and monitoring costs and thus allowing more 
investment projects to be financed and, ex ante, increasing the aggregate success probability, 
financial institutions and markets can ultimately have a positive impact on investment and 
resource allocation. Similarly, by identifying the entrepreneurs with the most promising 
technologies, financial intermediaries can also boost the rate of technological innovation and 
ultimately growth.
 
7 A similar argument holds for financial markets: in larger and more liquid 
markets, agents have greater incentives to invest in research on enterprises and projects, 
which produces information that can be turned into trading gains, ultimately improving 
resource allocation.8
Fourth, both financial institutions and markets can help monitor enterprises and 
reduce agency problems within firms between management and majority and minority 
shareholders, again improving resource allocation. Debt instruments can reduce the amount 
of free cash available to firms and thus managerial slack (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 
1999), while liquid stock exchanges can allow investors to monitor and discipline enterprises 
through the threat of takeovers and subsequent dismissal of management.
 
9
                                                          
5 See, for example, McKinnon (1973), Sirri and Tufano (1995), and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). 
 Linking stock 
performance to manager compensation can help align the interests of managers with those of 
6 See, for example,Trew (2010). 
7 See, for example, King and Levine (1993b) and Blackburn and Huang (1998). 
8 See Grossmann and Stiglitz (1980), among others. 
9 Scharfstein (1988) and Stein (1988). 
 
owners,10 although it is important to define a proper benchmark. Similarly, as in the case of 
screening, financial institutions can economize on the costs of monitoring by functioning as 
“delegated monitor.”11
Fifth, banks can also help reduce liquidity risk and thus enable long-term investment, 
as shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). By pooling savings of patient and impatient 
agents, financial institutions can transform short-term liabilities into long-term assets, 
enabling long-term investment and ultimately economic growth. Similarly, liquid markets can 
enable investment in long-term investment projects while at the same time allowing investors 
to have access to their savings at short-term notice (Levine, 1991). Financial institutions can 
also ease liquidity needs of enterprises, enabling long-term investment and R&D activities.
 By building long-term relationships, financial institutions can further 
reduce monitoring costs. Both financial markets and institutions can thus improve resource 
allocation and productivity growth. By reducing control problems of investors vis-à-vis 
owners and managers of enterprises, improved corporate governance can also increase 
savings and capital accumulation. 
12
Sixth, financial institutions and markets allow cross-sectional diversification across 
projects, allowing risky innovative activity while guaranteeing an ex ante contracted interest 
rate to savers (King and Levine, 1993b). Furthermore, aggregate risk that cannot be 
diversified away at a specific point in time can be diversified by long-living financial 
intermediaries over time (Allen and Gale, 1997). 
 
Beyond theoretical models, economists have explained the take-off of the Industrial 
Revolution in some countries earlier than others to the availability of finance. Hicks (1969) 
argued that the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom was possible due to the 
developing British financial system. Although many inventions were made before the 
                                                          
10 Diamond and Verrecchia (1982) and Jensen and Murphy (1990). 
11 Diamond (1984) and Bencivenga and Smith (1993). 
12 See Holmström and Tirole (1998) and Aghion et al. (2010). 
 
Industrial Revolution, liquid capital markets enabled investment into long-term projects that 
could use these inventions. Similarly, the Netherlands and the United States experienced 
financial deepening before their economic and political rise in the seventeenth and twentieth 
centuries, respectively. 
The relationship between finance and growth is not a one-way street; rather, higher 
growth induced by financial deepening increases demand for financial services, ultimately 
resulting in a virtuous circle of economic and financial development (Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990). This theoretical insight has also resulted in additional challenges for the 
empirical finance and growth literature, as a positive relationship between financial and 
economic development might reflect causation from economic to financial development. 
Theory, however, is not unambiguous in predicting a positive impact of financial 
deepening on economic growth. Better resource allocation may depress saving rates enough 
such that overall growth rates actually drop with enhanced financial development.13 This can 
happen if the income effect of higher interest rates is larger than the substitution effect.  The 
financial sector might also attract too many resources relative to the real sector, with negative 
repercussions for growth.14
                                                          
13 See, for example, Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and King and Levine (1993b). 
 Critically, the impact of finance on growth might vary across 
different levels of income per capita, with the positive relationship being strongest among 
low- and middle-income countries that are catching up to high-income countries in their 
productivity levels and fading away as countries approach the global productivity frontier 
(Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005). A somewhat separate but related discussion is 
that about the importance of financial sector development compared to other sectors and 
14 Philippon (2010) models the trade-off between the financial sector helping overcome  
agency problems, while at the same time competing for human resources with the real sector. In a situation 
where the social value of entrepreneurship is larger than the private value, the financial sector can be too large 
compared to the entrepreneurial sector. Similarly, Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011) model how 
individuals can choose to work in the real sector or as dealers in the financial sector. While dealers can provide 
entrepreneurs incentives to originate good assets,.they might extract excessively high informational rents and 
thus attract too much young talent towards the financial industry, thus leading to lower GDP per capita growth. 
 
policies in explaining growth. This ambiguity has motivated a large empirical literature over 
the past twenty years, to which I turn now. 
 
2.2. Finance and Growth: From Correlation to Causality 
The empirical literature on finance and growth has made enormous progress over the past two 
decades. To the same extent that the challenge of causality has been addressed, researchers 
have moved from aggregate macro-level data to more micro-level data, in the process also 
disentangling the mechanisms and channels through which financial development is 
associated with economic growth. 
Goldsmith (1969) was the first to show empirically the positive correlation between 
financial development and GDP per capita, using data on the assets of financial 
intermediaries relative to GNP and data on the sum of net issues of bonds and securities plus 
changes in loans relative to GNP for thirty-five countries over the period 1860 to 1963. Such 
a correlation, however, does not control for other factors associated with economic growth 
and might thus be driven by other country characteristics correlated with both finance and 
growth. Second, such a correlation does not provide any information on the direction of 
causality between finance and growth. The early finance and growth literature has therefore 
used standard cross-country ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to control for other 
country characteristics associated with growth differences across countries (King and Levine, 
1993a, 1993b). This literature has shown that both banking sector as well as equity market 
development are robust predictors of GDP per capita growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998). 
In a second step, researchers have addressed the issue of reverse causation and 
omitted variables using instrumental variable techniques. Using external instruments, such as 
historic country characteristics that can explain cross-country variation in financial sector 
 
development, or internal instruments such as lagged values of financial sector indicators, 
several papers have shown that the relationship between financial sector development and 
economic growth is not due to reverse causation or omitted variable bias. Specifically, 
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) show that 
instrumenting financial development with the legal traditions of countries and applying 
dynamic panel techniques with lagged values as instruments confirm the positive relationship 
between finance and growth.15
An alternative approach has been to explore the relationship between financial 
development and GDP per capita for a specific country over time. Compared to cross-country 
research, the time-series approach relies on higher frequency data (mostly yearly) to gain 
econometric power. The causality approach of the time-series approach, however, is 
different; specifically, the Granger causality tests are tests of forecast capacity—that is, to 
what extent does one series contain information about the other series? Unlike the cross-
country panel regressions discussed earlier, this concept therefore does not control for 
omitted variable bias by directly including other variables or by controlling with instrumental 
variables. Rather, by including a rich lag structure, which is lacking in the cross-sectional 
approach, the time-series approach hopes to capture omitted variables. Numerous papers have 
found evidence for Granger causality from finance to economic development, though the 
evidence has been not unambiguous.
 
16 There is also evidence for bidirectional causality, 
consistent with theory.17
An alternative to the instrumental variable and time-series approaches is to explore 
the mechanisms or channels through which financial development affects economic growth, 
 
                                                          
15 A related literature has explored the relationship between financial liberalization and  economic growth. See, 
for example, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) and Henry (2003). 
16 See, for example, Rousseau and Sylla (2005) for the United States, Bell and Rousseau (2001) for India, and 
Neusser and Kugler (1998) and Xu (2000) for cross-country samples. 
17 See, for example, Demetriades and Hussein (1996). 
 
which can also be seen as “smoking gun” approach. This implies testing for a differential 
impact of financial development on different sectors or industries. In a seminal paper, Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) show that industries that depend more on external financing grow faster 
in countries with higher levels of financial development. It is important to note that this is a 
relative effect, because it is gauged by differences-in-differences—the difference between a 
high-dependence and low-dependence industry in a well-developed financial system 
compared to a less developed financial system. Critical for their methodology is that their 
measure of external dependence captures purely demand-side effects; the authors claim to 
achieve this by focusing on a sample of large listed U.S. enterprises that should face a 
perfectly price-elastic supply curve. Following Rajan and Zingales, this differences-in-
differences technique has been used widely in the literature, showing that financial 
development is conducive to the growth of industries with larger growth opportunities, more 
dependent on intangible assets, and with a larger share of small enterprises.18
An alternative differences-in-differences approach is similar to an event study that 
focuses on a financial sector policy change. Most prominent in this context is the branch 
deregulation episode in the United States in the 1970s and ’80s when states liberalized intra- 
and interstate branching. Using this almost identical policy reform implemented at different 
points in time, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that deregulation led to lower loan losses 
and higher economic growth. Subsequent work has shown that this deregulation was also 
associated with an increase in entrepreneurship
 
19 and lower economic volatility.20
The finance and growth literature has also explored the channels through which 
financial deepening fosters economic growth. There is robust evidence that the impact is 
 
                                                          
18 For an application of the differences-in-differences estimation, see, for example, Beck and Levine (2002), 
Beck (2003), Beck et al. (2008), Braun and Larrain (2005), Fisman and Love (2003), and Raddatz (2006). 
19 Black and Strahan (2002) and Kerr and Nanda (2009). 
20 Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004), Acharya, Imbs, and Sturgess (2011), and Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and 
Sørensen (2007). Similar work has been undertaken across different regions of Italy; see Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales (2004). 
 
more through improved resource allocation, accumulation of knowledge, and productivity 
growth rather than through capital accumulation.21
One of the critical functions of the financial system, as already described, is maturity 
transformation. By enabling long-term investment projects, finance can help foster economic 
growth. Through this channel, financial systems can also help reduce volatility. Financial 
systems can alleviate firms’ liquidity constraints and facilitate long-term investment, which 
ultimately reduces the volatility of both investment and growth.
 There is also evidence that financial 
deepening affects the corporate structure of the private sector; firms are more likely to 
incorporate in countries with better developed financial and legal systems (Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Love, and Maksimovic, 2006). 
22 Similarly, well-developed 
financial markets and institutions can help dampen the negative impact that exchange rate 
volatility has on firms’ liquidity and thus investment capacity.23
Recent publications have tested for the cross-country heterogeneity of the finance and 
growth relationship. There is evidence that the effect of financial development is strongest 
among middle-income countries, whereas other work finds a declining effect of finance and 
growth as countries grow richer, explaining this effect with finance helping countries catch 
up to the productivity frontier but not having any effect beyond this.
 
24
                                                          
21 See Ang (2011), Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000), and Wurgler (2000). 
 More recently, Arcand, 
Berkes, and Panizza (2011) find that the finance and growth relationship turns negative for 
high-income countries, identifying a value of 110 percent private credit to GDP as 
approximate turning point, with the negative relationship between finance and growth turning 
significant at around 150 percent private credit to GDP, levels reached by some high-income 
countries in the 2000s. 
22 See Aghion et al. (2010). 
23 See Aghion et al. (2009). 
24 Rioja and Valev (2004a, 2004b) and Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005). 
 
It is important to note that there have also been a number of empirical studies 
criticizing the finance and growth relationship. A series of articles have shed doubt on the 
robustness of the finance and growth relationship.25
Overall, the overwhelming empirical evidence so far points to a positive relationship 
between financial deepening and economic growth beyond a pure correlation, a relationship 
that might vary over time and country conditions, however. In addition, there are important 
 Other authors have focused on a direct 
relationship between the contractual framework that underpins financial sector development 
and economic growth. Using the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodologies of matching 
industry with country characteristics, Claessens and Laeven (2003) find that industries more 
reliant on intangible assets, such as patents and trademarks, grow faster in countries with 
stronger contractual institutions. Evidence for a sample of four East European transition 
economies shows that trust in property rights, rather than access to credit, encourages 
entrepreneurs to reinvest their profits (Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, 2002), whereas 
evidence for China shows that both the quality of contractual institutions and access to 
finance explains profit reinvestment (Cull and Xu, 2005). Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
undertake a horse race on the aggregate level between contractual institutions that underpin 
financial development and protection of private property rights from expropriation by 
government and find that the latter (rather than the former) matters for long-term economic 
development. There is evidence, however, that this finding is due to the selection of the 
proxies for both contractual institutions and property rights protection and can be 
reinterpreted as the relative importance of the overall institutional framework (including 
informal institutions and norms) vis-à-vis formal institutions (such as courts) (Woodruff, 
2006). 
                                                          
25 Favara (2003) criticizes the lack of robustness of the findings of Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) to changes 
in the sample. Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) question the robustness of the cross-country relationship between 
finance and growth in a sample extended in the period of the Great Moderation of the early twenty-first century. 
 
nonlinearities. This evidence also gives a first hint at the fragility that can arise from rapidly 
expanding financial systems, a topic I return to .later. 
 
2.3. Banks versus Markets: Does Financial Structure Matter? 
Until now, I have treated the financial system as a homogeneous sector. However, financial 
institutions, most prominently banks, and financial markets overcome the agency problem in 
different ways. Financial institutions create private information, which helps them reduce 
information asymmetries. Financial markets, on the other hand, create public information, 
aggregated into prices. Similarly, there are differences in the mechanisms through which 
financial institutions and markets exercise corporate governance. Banks can help improve 
corporate governance directly through loan covenants and direct influence on firm policy and 
indirectly through reducing the amount of free cash flows senior management has available. 
Financial markets can help improve corporate governance by linking payment of senior 
management to performance, through voting structures and the threat of takeover if the stock 
price falls below a value that is seen below fair value. Finally, there are different ways 
financial institutions and markets help diversify risks. Banks offer better intertemporal risk 
diversification tools, whereas markets are better in diversifying risk cross-sectionally. 
Markets are better in offering standardized products, and banks are better in offering 
customized solutions. However, banks and markets can also be complementary through 
instruments such as securitization, allowing exit strategies for venture capitalists, and by 
providing competition to each other.26
However, there are also important arguments of why banks are better than markets 
and vice versa. In liquid markets, investors can inexpensively and quickly sell their shares 
 
                                                          
26 See Stulz (2001) for an overview. 
 
and consequently have fewer incentives to expend resources monitoring managers.27 Bank-
based systems mitigate this problem because banks reveal less information in public 
markets.28 Also, efficient markets can reduce the effectiveness of takeovers as a disciplining 
tool. Atomistic shareholders have incentives to capture the benefits from a takeover by 
holding their shares instead of selling them, thus making takeover attempts less profitable 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980). On the other hand, proponents of the market-based view 
emphasize that powerful banks frequently stymie innovation by extracting informational rents 
and protecting established firms (Hellwig, 1991). The banks’ market power then reduces 
firms’ incentives to undertake profitable projects because banks extract a large share of the 
profits (Rajan, 1992). Also, banks—as debt issuers—have an inherent bias toward 
conservative investments, so that bank-based systems might stymie innovation and growth.29
Cross-country comparisons have not provided evidence for either view. Evidence on 
the aggregate cross-country level, on the cross-country cross-industry level, and on the cross-
country firm level have not found any evidence that countries, industries, or firms grow faster 
in countries with either more bank-based or more market-based financial systems.
 
30
                                                          
27 See Bhide (1993) and Stiglitz (1985). 
 Rather, 
the overall level of financial development, not structure, explains cross-country variation in 
economic growth. This is consistent with the financial services view, which focuses on the 
delivery of financial services and less on who delivers them. However, it is also consistent 
with the view that the optimal financial structure changes as financial systems develop, 
consistent with theoretical models to this effect (Boyd and Smith, 1998). It is also consistent 
with findings on different income elasticities of different segments of the financial system. 
The development of contractual savings institutions and capital markets is much more 
28 See Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993). 
29 See Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Morck and Nakamura (1999). 
30 See Levine (2002), Beck and Levine (2002), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), respectively. 
 
income-elastic than the development of the banking system (Beck et al., 2008). This finding 
is consistent with the observation that most low-income countries have more bank-based 
financial systems. As more detailed data on different segments of the financial system and on 
the users of financial services, including firms and households, become available, more 
research can be undertaken in this area. 
 
2.4. International Dimension: Finance and Trade Patterns 
The efficiency with which the financial system intermediates society’s savings has a 
significant effect on resource allocation and thus economic structure. It is therefore not 
surprising that financial sector development also has a significant effect on the structure of a 
country’s trade balance. Because financial development can steer resource allocation toward 
specific sectors and industries, it can also turn into a comparative advantage in certain sectors 
and industries. 
Theoretical models have shown that financial development turns into a comparative 
advantage for countries in sectors and industries with higher needs for external finance.31
There is quite a bit of empirical support for these theoretical models. Countries with 
higher levels of financial development have higher shares of manufacturing exports and 
 Ju 
and Wei (2005) show that if the external finance constraint is binding in the economy, then 
further financial deepening will increase the output of the industry more dependent on 
external finance. On a more micro-level, Manova (2010) shows that productivity cutoffs for 
enterprises to become exporters vary across sectors with different needs for external finance 
and decreases with financial development. In addition to traditional endowments, such as 
land, labor, and human and physical capital, the degree to which financial systems can ease 
financing constraints of enterprises can thus also turn into a comparative advantage. 
                                                          
31 See Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), Beck (2002), and Matsuyama (2005). 
 
higher export shares in industries with higher financing needs (Beck, 2002, 2003). Countries 
with higher levels of financial development have higher export shares and trade balance in 
industries with more intangible assets (Hur, Raj, and Riyanto, 2006). Equity market 
liberalization increases exports disproportionately more in financially vulnerable sectors that 
require more outside finance or employ fewer collateralizable assets (Manova, 2008). In 
addition, total exports in financially more developed countries are more sensitive to exchange 
rate movements than in countries at lower levels of financial development (Becker and 
Greenberg, 2007). These cross-country findings are further confirmed by more disaggregate 
data. Using state-level data for the United States, Michalski and Örs (2011) find that 
interstate branch deregulation led to a significant increase in exports relative to domestic 
shipments. On the firm level, several papers have found a significant relationship between 
credit constraints and the decision to become an exporter.32
 
 
2.5. Access to Financial Services 
Until now, I have discussed the relationship between financial development and aggregate 
economic welfare or aggregate real sector outcomes. However, financial development can 
have distributional effects because it benefits different groups of households or firms to a 
different extent. Transaction costs and risk profiles vary across the firm and household 
population and can be binding constraints for certain groups, especially small enterprises and 
the poor, when trying to access financial services. Small firms consistently report higher 
financing obstacles than medium and large enterprises, and they are also more adversely 
affected in their operation and growth by these obstacles.33
                                                          
32 See, for example, Berman and Héricourt (2008) and Muûls (2008). 
 This can have an impact on firm 
size distribution across economies. For example, survey analysis has shown that smaller firms 
33 See Beck et al. (2006) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005), respectively. 
 
grow relatively faster in Germany than in Côte d’Ivoire, whereas the opposite holds for large 
firms (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 2002). 
Financial sector development can help reduce information asymmetries for small 
enterprises. The growth-constraining effect of financing obstacles has been found to be 
smaller in countries with better developed financial systems, and industries that have 
naturally more small enterprises grow faster in countries with higher levels of financial 
development.34
Quasi-natural experimental evidence confirms the importance of credit constraints for 
firm growth. Banerjee and Duflo (2004) analyzed detailed loan information on 253 Indian 
small and medium enterprises before and after they became eligible for a directed subsidized 
lending program and found that the additional credit resulted in a proportional increase in 
sales rather than a substitution for other nonsubsidized credit, indicating that these firms were 
credit-constrained before receiving subsidized credit. Similarly, Zia (2008) finds that small 
 The positive effect of financial and institutional development can also be 
observed in the use of external finance. Better protection of property rights increases external 
financing of small firms significantly more than it does for large firms, particularly due to the 
differential impact it has on bank and supplier finance (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic, 2008). Easier physical access to banking outlets is also associated with lower 
financing obstacles (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2007). Finally, evidence for a 
sample of European countries shows that financial development enhances new firm entry in 
sectors that depend more heavily on external finance and that the smallest size firms benefit 
the most from higher financial development in terms of higher entry rates. The same analysis 
also shows that financial development promotes the postentry growth of firms in sectors that 
depend more on external finance (Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta, 2007). 
                                                          
34 See, for example, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2008). 
 
nonlisted and nongroup firms in Pakistan reduce their sales after they become ineligible for 
subsidized export credit, indicating the existence of credit constraints; in contrast, large, 
listed, and group firms do not reduce their sales after losing access to subsidized credit. 
The evidence of access to financial services at the household level is more nuanced. 
Access to credit is not unambiguously associated with higher welfare; different estimation 
methods and different samples provide contradictory evidence.35 More recent evidence, 
however, has shown a differential impact of improved access to financial services on 
different household groups (Banerjee et al., 2010), with households that are inclined to 
become entrepreneurs more likely to do so with improved access to credit or savings services, 
while others spend more on consumption.36
Related to the debate on access to finance by different groups is the question on 
enterprise versus household credit. Although the theoretical and empirical literature has 
clearly shown the positive impact of enterprise credit for firm and aggregate growth, theory 
has made ambiguous predictions on the role of household credit. Although Jappelli and 
Pagano (1994) argue that alleviating credit constraints on households reduces the savings 
rate, with negative repercussions for economic growth, Galor and Zeira (1993) and De 
Gregorio (1996) argue that household credit can foster economic development if it increases 
human capital accumulation. Tentative cross-country evidence has shown that the positive 
effect of financial deepening comes mostly through enterprise credit, and there is no 
significant relationship between the importance of household credit and economic growth 
(Beck et al., 2009). This finding, together with the observation of an increasing share of 
household credit in total bank lending in many developed economies over the past decades, 
 
                                                          
35 See, for example, Pitt and Khandker (1998), Morduch (1998), Coleman (1999), Karlan and Zinman (2010); 
see Karlan and Morduch (2010) for a recent overview. 
36 See also Dupas and Robinson (2009) for an assessment of improved access to savings services in Kenya. 
 
mostly for mortgages, can go some way toward explaining the diminishing growth benefits 
from financial deepening in high-income countries. 
 
2.6. The Distributional Effects of Financial Development: Theory and Evidence 
Given that financial sector development helps reduce access problems, the question arises 
about distributional effects of financial sector deepening. Although the cross-country 
literature has focused mainly on average income growth, researchers have recently turned 
their attention to distributional implications of financial sector deepening. 
Theory makes ambiguous predictions about the distributional repercussions of 
finance. On the one hand, financial imperfections, such as information and transactions costs, 
are especially binding on the poor, who lack collateral and credit histories, as already 
discussed. Thus, any relaxation of these credit constraints will disproportionately benefit the 
poor. Furthermore, these credit constraints reduce the efficiency of capital allocation and 
intensify income inequality by impeding the flow of capital to poor individuals with high 
expected return investments.37
In contrast, some theories predict that financial development primarily helps the rich. 
According to this view, the poor rely on informal, family connections for capital, so that 
improvements in the formal financial sector inordinately benefit the rich. The model by 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), previously discussed, predicts a nonlinear relationship 
between financial development, income inequality, and economic development. At all stages 
of economic development, financial development improves capital allocation, boosts 
 From this perspective, financial development helps the poor 
both by improving the efficiency of capital allocation, which accelerates aggregate growth, 
and by relaxing credit constraints that more extensively restrain the poor, which reduces 
income inequality. 
                                                          
37 See Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), and Galor and Moav (2004). 
 
aggregate growth, and helps the poor through this channel. However, the distributional effect 
of financial development, and hence the net impact on the poor, depends on the level of 
economic development. At early stages of development, only the rich can afford to access 
and directly profit from better financial markets. At higher levels of economic development, 
many people access financial markets so that financial development directly helps a larger 
proportion of society. 
First empirical cross-country evidence points to a propoor effect of financial sector 
deepening. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007) show that countries with higher levels 
of financial development experience faster reductions in income inequality and poverty 
levels. Clarke, Xu, and Zou (2006) show a negative relationship between financial sector 
development and the level of poverty. This suggests that financial sector development is not 
only progrowth but also propoor. Unlike other policy areas, which might have opposing 
effects on growth and equity, financial sector development does not present such concerns. 
The theoretical models discussed here also give insights into the possible channels 
through which financial development can help reduce income inequality and poverty. On the 
one hand, providing access to credit to the poor might help them overcome financing 
constraints and allow them to invest in microenterprises and human capital accumulation.38
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On the other hand, there might be indirect effects through enterprise credit. By expanding 
credit to existing and new enterprises and allocating society’s savings more efficiently, 
financial systems can expand the formal economy and pull larger segments of the population 
into the formal labor market. First explorations of the channels through which finance affects 
income inequality and poverty levels point to an important role of such indirect effects. 
Specifically, evidence from both the United States and Thailand suggests that an important 
effect of financial sector deepening on income inequality and poverty is indirect. By changing 
 
the structure of the economy and allowing more entry into the labor market of previously un- 
or underemployed segments of the population, finance helps reduce income inequality and 
poverty, but not by giving access to credit to everyone.39 This is also consistent with cross-
country evidence that financial deepening is positively associated with employment growth in 
developing countries (Pagano and Pica, 2012). It is important to stress that this is preliminary 
evidence to be confirmed or refuted by future research, but it has focused the debate on an 
important question: should policy makers focus on deepening or broadening financial 
sectors? It has also helped broaden the debate on financial services for the poor beyond 
microcredit to other financial services, such as savings services, payment services (especially 
in the context of receiving remittances from family members that emigrated to other parts of 
the country or the world), and insurance services.40
 
 
2.7. Finance and Economic Development: Conclusions and Looking Forward 
There is strong historical, theoretical, and empirical evidence for a positive role of financial 
deepening in the economic development process. Evidence for cross-country heterogeneity 
and nonlinearity in this relationship, however, has posed new challenges for researchers and 
establishes a direct link to the theme of the next section—financial fragility resulting from 
rapid financial deepening. There have been attempts to reconcile the long-term positive 
effects of finance with the negative short-term effects of rapid credit growth (Loayza and 
Rancière, 2006). More research along these lines is certainly needed. Furthermore, recent 
evidence that financial sector deepening might actually have a negative effect on growth 
beyond a certain threshold has raised additional questions on the optimal size and resource 
allocation to the financial sector.  
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The increasing availability of micro-data has broadened the research agenda to 
exploring the effect of broadening access to financial services by enterprises and households, 
which will give additional insights into the channels through which finance fosters growth 
and helps reduce poverty. The literature on finance, income inequality and poverty, is still in 
its early years; more research can be expected in this area. This will also help bring empirical 
work closer to theoretical explorations of the finance and growth link. 
 
3. Financial Fragility: Causes and Policies 
The same mechanism that makes finance growth-enhancing also contains the seed of 
destruction, as illustrated by the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. By transforming short-
term liabilities into long-term assets, banks can foster economic growth but can also become 
susceptible to bank runs, be they informed or uninformed. Agency problems between banks 
and their depositors and creditors can lead to excessive risk taking and fragility. 
In the following, I focus mostly on fragility of banks, although boom-and-bust cycles 
are very common to financial markets in general and are often related to banking distress. 
However, due to the maturity-mismatch and promissory intensity, the contagion risk is 
highest in the banking sector. After covering the sources of banking fragility, I discuss the 
empirical literature on idiosyncratic and systemic bank fragility, before turning to regulatory 
issues. 
 
3.1. Financial Fragility: Bank Runs and Moral Hazard 
Theoretical models focus on two different sources of fragility related to liability and asset 
risk. As already discussed, liability risk arises from the maturity mismatch between assets and 
liabilities. When some depositors withdraw their funds prematurely and unexpectedly, this 
 
can lead to bank runs and collapses. Such runs can be either based on fundamentals, and thus 
be information-based, or irrational. If the return on banks’ long-term assets is stochastic, new 
information about future negative shocks on these investments can lead to the expectation by 
depositors that banks will not be able to meet future commitments and will therefore lead to 
runs (Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988). Irrational bank runs, on the other hand, arise from the 
simple fear of some depositors that others might withdraw before them. Irrational bank runs 
might also be based on the inability of uninformed depositors to distinguish between liquidity 
and solvency shocks of banks, that is, the inability to distinguish between regular withdrawal 
behavior of depositors and the reaction of informed depositors to negative information about 
the future solvency of the bank (Chari and Jagannathan, 1988). 
A bank run is not only disruptive for the bank in question, as it might imply costly 
divestment of assets and/or liquidation of assets, it can also have contagion effects throughout 
the banking and financial system through the domino effect. Such effects can happen either 
through bank runs on other banks or through the payment system or the interbank market. 
Observation by depositors of runs on one bank can lead to panic runs on other banks to not be 
the last one to withdraw money or due to information updates about the underlying solvency 
position of other banks. Domino effects can also happen through linkages in interbank 
market, with failure of one bank to satisfy commitments leading to negative solvency shocks 
at other banks. Similarly, a payment system based on netting out of positions between banks 
can lead to contagion effects throughout the banking system, unlike the real-time gross 
payment system, where each transaction is settled separately and immediately.41
A second important risk is on the asset side, related to the principal agent problem 
between the bank and depositors and other creditors. Previously I discussed the principal 
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agent problems between banks and borrowers, but there is a similar agency problem, based 
on asymmetric information, between banks and their depositors and creditors. As can be 
easily shown, banks’ incentives to properly screen and monitor borrowers and thus ensure 
repayment decrease in their leverage ratio. This has been also described as the put option 
character of banking; given limited liability, bank owners have the option to sell the bank 
with the strike price being the value of liabilities. Whereas depositors bear only the downside 
risk of banks’ risk decisions, owners and managers (acting in the interest of owners) 
participate in both the up and down side of these risk decisions. Although this is a common 
problem throughout corporate finance, the situation is exacerbated in the case of banks by the 
fact that debtholders are disperse (there are many depositors with small deposits), often 
uninformed, and always have the incentive to free-ride on the efforts of others, and the 
opacity of banks’ assets, most of which are not market-priced or priceable. 
The fragility of banking and the negative repercussions of bank failure for the 
financial system and the economy at large has made it one of the most regulated sectors in 
human history, with the exception of few episodes in modern history, such as free banking in 
Scotland between 1695 and 1845 and the experience of some U.S. states in the nineteenth 
century. Deposit insurance has been considered a policy to reduce the likelihood of bank runs 
because it insures depositors for their savings (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Alternatively, 
liquidity support by a lender-of-last-resort can help address banks’ short-term liquidity 
problems (Bagehot, 1873). Capital requirements and lending restrictions have been advocated 
to address the potential for asset fragility, as well as strong supervisors that can replace weak 
or missing monitoring and discipline from depositors. I return to the regulatory approach 
toward banking and the financial sector in general later, but first discuss the link between 
idiosyncratic bank fragility and systemic banking distress. 
 
3.2. From Idiosyncratic to Systemic Distress 
Financial history is full of bank failures and financial boom-and-bust cycles, linked to a 
variety of factors, often with similar features (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). To the same extent 
that well-developed financial systems can foster economic growth, banking crises are often 
associated with deep economic recessions and long-term negative growth repercussions. 
Recent comparisons of economic crises have shown that economic recessions related to 
banking distress tend to be deeper and longer than other recessions.42
Due to the agency problems between lenders and borrowers and lenders and 
depositors, described above, bank credit is inherently cyclical and typically more volatile than 
the economic cycle. As agency costs on both sides of banks’ balance sheets fluctuate with the 
business cycle, so do cost of credit and credit flows. Credit booms typically feed on 
themselves and are often linked with asset price booms. As asset prices rise and thus 
collateral values, more credit is granted. The reverse can happen during a downturn, where 
asset prices fall, borrowers’ balance sheets deteriorate, and bank lending is typically reduced 
at a faster pace than GDP and can in turn dampen real sector activity further. Credit and asset 
price movements feed on each other, which can lead to upward and downward spirals.
 Specifically, output 
losses of recessions with credit crunches are two or three times as high as in other recessions. 
Many of these banking crises are related to the failure of several (rather than single) financial 
institutions or even systemic distress throughout the banking system. In the following, I 
discuss the link between idiosyncratic bank failures, due to incentive misalignments and 
inherent fragility and systemic banking distress. 
43
Beyond credit cycles related to agency costs, financial systems are subject to recurrent 
systemic fragility, often related to financial liberalization.  In the 1970s and ’80s, the search 
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for growth benefits led many countries to liberalize financial systems, privatize government-
owned banks, and open capital accounts. These liberalizations often led to credit and asset 
booms and aggressive risk taking by banks. Though fiscal profligacy, exchange rate policy, 
and external shocks have also contributed to crises, problems in the financial systems were 
often at the core of the fragility, and these systemic banking crises put in doubt the overall 
positive contribution of financial development to economic development. Careful analysis of 
these crises, however, has shown that often the absence of the necessary regulatory reforms 
that should accompany liberalization can explain the fragility (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1999). Systemic banking distress is often also related to currency crises. Rapid 
real exchange rate movements can undermine banks’ solvency position, while the need to 
support failing banks can undermine exchange rate stability. Common causes might drive 
both, such as macroeconomic policies. Theoretical and empirical work has confirmed the 
close interlinkages of banking distress and currency crises.44
Banking crises, however, have not been limited to developing and emerging 
economies. Even before the current crisis, the 1980s and 90s saw the savings and loan crisis 
in the United States, the Japanese banking crisis, and several banking crises in Scandinavia. 
Many of the systemic banking crises in developing and developed countries involved large 
amounts of nonperforming assets and bank insolvencies, the need for nationalization and 
recapitalization, bank holidays, and government guarantees for deposits and assets. In many 
cases, frameworks for systematic work-out of nonperforming assets were created, either by 
banks on a decentralized basis or by creation of asset management companies. 
  
Statistical analyses of systemic banking crises have pointed to several macroeconomic 
signals, including real exchange rate appreciation (often linked to rapid capital inflows), low 
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growth, high real interest rates and inflation, as well as rapid credit growth.45 Other studies 
have linked the exchange rate regime, the degree of dollarization, and banking market 
structure to the likelihood of systemic banking distress.46
The costs of systemic banking distress can be substantial, as reported by Laeven and 
Valencia (2008), reaching over 50 percent of GDP in some cases in fiscal costs and over 100 
percent in output loss. Fiscal costs arise typically from recapitalization of failing banks or 
deposit insurance losses, whereas output costs can arise through several channels, most 
importantly through firms losing access to external finance. Several papers have shown how 
borrowers have suffered after their institution failed. Several studies have shown the negative 
economic repercussions of bank failures in the 1920s and ’30s in the United States and the 
consequent loss of lending relationships,
 
47 and documented the decline in lending and local 
GDP following the closure of a large (solvent) affiliate in a regional bank holding company 
in Texas in the 1990s (Ashcraft, 2005). Other studies have shown the importance of lending 
relationships across a sample of Korean firms that worked with either failed or surviving 
banks after the crisis and the negative effect of bank insolvency announcement during the 
East Asian crisis on market values of the banks’ borrowers.48 On a more aggregate level, 
cross-country comparisons have shown that during banking crises, industries that depend 
more on external finance are hurt disproportionately more, an effect that is stronger in 
countries with better developed financial systems.49
The trade-off between the positive growth effects of financial deepening following 
liberalization and the costs of systemic banking distress that also often comes after 
liberalization has raised the question of relative benefits and costs of liberalization. A cross-
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country comparison of the growth benefits of liberalization and growth costs of subsequent 
crises, however, has shown that the benefits outweigh the costs significantly, that is, the 
positive growth effect of financial liberalization is larger than the negative growth effect from 
a crisis that follows liberalization (Rancière, Tornell, and Westermann, 2006). 
Directly related to the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks to systemic distress is the 
debate on the relationship between competition and banking distress. Some models predict 
that more concentrated and less competitive banking systems are more stable, as profits 
provide a buffer against fragility and provide incentives against excessive risk taking. This 
“charter value” view of banking sees banks as choosing the risk of their asset portfolio.50 In 
more competitive environment with more pressures on profits, banks have higher incentives 
to take more excessive risks, resulting in higher fragility. In systems with restricted entry and 
therefore limited competition, on the other hand, banks have better profit opportunities, 
capital cushions, and therefore fewer incentives to take aggressive risks, with positive 
repercussions for financial stability. In addition, in more competitive environment, banks earn 
fewer informational rents from their relationship with borrowers, reducing their incentives to 
properly screen borrowers, again increasing the risk of fragility.51
An opposing view is that a more concentrated banking structure results in more bank 
fragility. Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) argue lower interest following from higher competition 
incentivizes borrowers to choose less risky investment projects. Thus, in many 
 These models thus predict 
that deregulation resulting in more entry and competition, such as in the United States in the 
1970s and 1980s and in many emerging markets, would lead to more fragility. 
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parameterizations of the model, Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) find a positive relationship 
between concentration and bank fragility and thus the probability of systemic distress.52
The empirical evidence on the relationship between competition and stability has not 
been conclusive, partly due to measurement challenges on both competition and stability. 
Empirical studies for specific countries—many if not most for the United States—have not 
come to conclusive evidence for an either stability-enhancing or stability-undermining role of 
competition. However, two conclusions can be drawn. First, a higher degree of market 
concentration does not necessarily imply less competition. Specifically, testing for the 
relationship between market structure and stability and for the relationship between 
competition and stability does not necessarily yield the same results. Second, as predicted by 
several theoretical studies, there is an important interaction effect between the regulatory and 
supervisory framework, on the one hand, and market structure and competitiveness, on the 
other hand, in their effect on banking system stability, a topic I return to later. 
 
The cross-country literature has found that more concentrated banking systems are 
less likely to suffer a systemic banking crisis as are more competitive banking systems.53 
There also seems to be evidence that banks in more competitive banking systems hold more 
capital, thus compensating for the potentially higher risk they are taking.54
 
 This debate is 
certainly still ongoing and has received additional impetus with the recent crisis. 
3.3. Market Discipline or Regulation? 
The functions and structure of financial institutions make their failures especially damaging 
for other financial institutions and the economy at large. The provision of payment services is 
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only feasible if banks belong to a network, the maturity transformation results in the risk of 
maturity mismatch and liquidity shortages in the case of shocks such as bank runs, and the 
screening and monitoring function of financial institutions implies the creation of private 
information. The consequence of these functions is that the failure of a financial institution 
results in negative externalities beyond the private costs of failure; it imposes external costs 
on other financial institutions and the economy at large. As already discussed, these external 
costs materialize especially in systemic banking crises, though also with idiosyncratic bank 
failures, increasing in the size and importance of financial institutions. 
The external costs that bank failure imposes on the rest of the financial system at large 
has made banking one of the most regulated sectors. The question, however, is what kind of 
regulations reduce the risk of bank runs and contagion and of excessive risk taking. Diamond 
and Rajan (2001) show that the combination of short-term liabilities and long-term assets 
provides for the necessary incentives of depositors to monitor and discipline banks and thus 
reduces principal agent problems. Regulations that reduce incentives of depositors to monitor 
and discipline banks, on the other hand, can exacerbate the principal agent problem and are 
thus counterproductive. Combining the analysis of fragility risks on asset and liability sides 
thus provides different insights than when focusing only on the liability side. 
This matches with empirical evidence that has pointed to the risks of regulations and 
mechanisms protecting depositors and reducing possibilities and incentives for them to 
monitor and discipline banks. Specifically, while deposit insurance schemes have been 
conceived to protect depositors (especially those with no means to monitor and discipline 
banks) and to avoid contagion effects, explicit deposit insurance schemes also have perverse 
incentive effects, as they send the signal that authorities stand ready to bail out banks, and 
 
thus provide incentives for banks to take excessive risks. This has been confirmed by 
empirical evidence, at least for developing countries.55
Hand in hand with the skepticism about the role of deposit insurance goes an 
emphasis on mechanisms that encourage and enable depositors and creditors to monitor and 
discipline banks. This private monitoring view thus focuses on transparency of financial 
statements, liability of auditors and senior management for financial statements, and the 
availability of marketable securities, such as subordinated debt, whose holders have an 
incentive to closely monitor and discipline banks. This view does not minimize the role of 
supervisors, but emphasizes that supervisors have an important role in enabling the private 
sector to play an appropriate role in the supervision process.
 
56
This view stands in contrast to the official supervision view that takes the failure of 
markets, including depositors, to appropriately monitor and discipline banks as a starting 
point and therefore posits a strong and active if not interventionist role for supervisors. This 
implies the right to intervene in good and bad times, screen and replace management, and 
restrict activities. The two approaches are not exclusive, a country like the United States has 
both powerful supervisors and the necessary conditions for market discipline, with an 
important caveat, as will be discussed. In many developing countries, the emphasis has been 
on building up powerful supervisory authorities, again on the premises that market discipline 
cannot work in small markets with few sophisticated investors. 
 
The recent crisis seems prima facie a rejection of the private monitoring view, as the 
market did not price risk accurately. One might also argue that discipline cannot be provided 
by markets that provide incentives for financial institutions to engage in herding (Boot, 2011) 
On the other hand, the period up to the crisis can be seen as a period where authorities across 
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the developed world systematically undermined market discipline by signaling ex ante that 
systemically important financial institutions would be bailed out.57
Even where supervisors were powerful—as in the United States—they failed to detain 
excessive risk taking in time. Levine (2010) argues convincingly that regulatory policies 
created incentives to aim for short-term profit, while at the same time allowing increased 
long-term fragility. Regulatory capital arbitrage was allowed whereby risky assets were 
shifted off the balance sheet, securitized in the form of special investment vehicles, and then 
put back on the balance sheet in the form of triple A–rated securities that did not need any 
capital. The crisis thus “represents the unwillingness of the policy apparatus to adapt to a 
dynamic, innovating financial system” (Levine, 2011).
 The repercussions to the 
Lehman Brothers insolvency—seen by authorities as a signal to reestablish market 
discipline—can be seen as the nail in the coffin to market discipline, as authorities in the 
future will avoid the messy failure of an institution so central to the global financial system 
and consequent freeze of global financial markets. 
58
The skepticism against supervisory and regulatory standards goes hand in hand with a 
differenced view on capital regulation (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006). While designed as 
cushion against unexpected losses and to reduce incentives to “bet-the-bank”, bank 
governance and ownership structure critically influence the impact of capital regulations on 
 The assessment that the inability of 
supervisors to detect and reduce fragility at early stages with traditional means contributed to 
the crisis is also consistent with evidence that the quality of bank supervisory standards, as 
measured by the Basel Core Principles is not significantly associated with bank stability, with 
the notable exception of transparency standards (Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel, 
2008). 
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risk-taking, as shown by several empirical studies. Specifically, Laeven and Levine (2009) 
find that banks with more powerful owners, as measured by the size of their shareholdings, 
tend to take greater risks, and even more so in countries with more stringent capital 
requirements, while capital regulations have the opposite effects on widely-held banks 
dominated by managers.  
Although their effect in preventing systemic banking distress is doubtful, powerful 
supervisors can have a negative effect on the efficiency and fairness of lending, as shown by 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006b). Specifically, self-reported obstacles on 
corruption in loan officers’ lending decisions are higher in countries with more powerful 
supervisors, and they are lower in countries where supervisory entities rely more on market 
power. 
There is similar and consistent evidence for financial markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006). Specifically, there is limited evidence for a positive role of 
public enforcement benefiting stock market development, while disclosure and liability rules 
enabling private monitoring foster larger and more liquid stock markets. 
 
3.4. Financial Fragility: A New Research Agenda 
The first global financial crisis of the twenty-first century has provided new challenges and 
new opportunities for exploring the causes of financial fragility and policy implications. It 
has reignited interest in the competition-stability debate. It has shed doubts on risk measures. 
It has shown that runs can not only happen on the retail level; new forms of contagion, such 
as through common asset exposure, have occurred.59
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 The crisis has also shown the urgent 
need for bridging the gap between macro- and financial economists, where the former focus 
on macroeconomic models without a properly modeled financial system and the latter ignore 
 
macroeconomic repercussions of financial sector fragility. The interest in bridging the gap 
has become obvious in recent work incorporating the two literatures and also in the debate on 
macroprudential regulation that looks beyond idiosyncratic risks toward the interaction 
between financial institutions and different segments of the financial system and feedback 
loops between banking, financial markets, and the real economy. This also includes recent 
papers that empirically explore the relationship between monetary policy, securitization 
through financial markets and banks’ risk taking.60
The recent crisis has also reignited the debate on the appropriate regulation of the 
financial system. Stronger capital requirements and more powerful supervisors are called for. 
One important area, often ignored, that calls for intensive reform is the resolution of failing 
banks. A similar trade-off as for deposit insurance exists: on the one hand, imminent failure 
of a large, too-important-to-fail bank provokes an immediate bail-out decision to protect 
depositors, other financial institutions, and the financial system at large as well as the real 
economy that—as shown—will suffer from bank failure. On the other hand, the expectation 
of a bail-out creates perverse incentives on the side of banks to take excessive risks, knowing 
that the downside part of these risks will be covered by taxpayers. Enforcing market 
discipline, however, by forcing financial institutions into regular insolvency proceedings, as 
with any regular corporation, can lead to the effects already described and observed in the 
case of Lehman Brothers. A solution that minimizes these external effects of bank insolvency 
while at the same time enforcing market discipline is thus necessary, especially for 
systemically important financial institutions. Recent suggestions include ex ante planned 
winding-down plans (living wills) and the issue of debt instruments that are automatically 
converted into equity claims when the value of existing equity nears zero. 
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Financial crises offer opportunities and challenges for researchers; they force them to 
rethink existing paradigms, develop new models, and reassess empirical relations. Similarly 
to the Great Depression of the twentieth century, the first global crisis of the twenty-first 
century will have an important impact on how researchers, analysts, and policy makers view 
financial fragility and the regulatory framework necessary to reduce this fragility and its 
impact. 
 
4. The Politics of Financial Development 
Given the important of the financial system for economic growth and fragility, it is not 
surprising that financial sector policies often top the agenda of policy makers, though more so 
during crisis periods. As I discuss, however, there are different views on where this interest 




4.1. Finance and Politics 
There are different hypotheses of why financial institutions and markets are so high on policy 
makers’ list. The public interest view argues that policy makers act in the best interest of 
society, ultimately maximizing the social planner’s problem, though possibly with less 
information available. This view also argues that the market failures inherent in financial 
markets and already discussed require a strong government involvement in the financial 
system beyond regulation and supervision. The private interest view, on the other hand, 
argues that policy makers, including regulators, act in their own interest, maximizing private 
                                                          
61 For a recent more complete survey, see Haber and Perotti (2008). 
 
rather than public welfare. Politicians thus do not intervene into the financial system to 
further public welfare but to divert the flow of credit to politically connected firms.62
The importance of access to external finance for entrepreneurs makes it an important 
tool in the struggle for real market shares. Access to finance can be used as barrier to entry 
into the real economy; empirical analysis has shown that exit rates during banking crises—
especially for finance-dependent young firms—are abnormally high in countries with more 
corrupt political institutions (Feijen and Perrotti, 2005). Access to external finance can also 
be used by incumbent political and economic elites to protect rents and entrench their 
dominant position. The use of financial as opposed to other resources is facilitated by the 
contingent nature of the liabilities as well as the authority of governments to create money. 
 
The U.S. financial history is plenty of examples for political influence on the banking 
system. Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010) show a strong relationship between voter suffrage 
and financial regulation. In times of low suffrage, the ruling elite used interest rate ceilings 
and entry barriers into banking to prevent competitors from gaining strength. Granting 
banking licenses was used to gain access to preferable loans for states and for the ruling 
elites. As voting suffrage expanded, there was a trend toward free banking where licensing 
was no longer controlled by the state legislature. 
One of the striking elements of the U.S. banking history is the predominance of 
branching restrictions throughout long periods, results of a compromise between populists 
and local bankers who wanted to protect their rents. Not until the 1970s and under the impact 
of technology were these restrictions loosened. As shown by Kroszner and Strahan (1999), 
the decision to deregulate branching on the state level was a function of both political 
structure and the lobbying strength of the banking sector. 
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Recent theoretical and empirical work has modeled and estimated the relative power 
and coalitions between labor and firm insiders, including management and majority 
shareholders, against minority shareholders to explain cross-country differences in 
contractual institutions underpinning financial institutions and markets.63
 
 An alternative 
explanation is the experience of the middle class losing their financial assets due to inflation 
in the period between the wars and subsequent political resistance against vibrant financial 
markets. This went hand in hand with a decision in these countries toward state-funded and -
managed pension funds, with lower need and demand for private pension funds and thus 
lower demand for protection of individual investor rights (Perotti and Schwienbacher, 2009). 
4.2. Finance and Politics: From Government Banking to Activist Policies 
Government intervention in the financial sector has been strong throughout history. Some 
countries initially only allowed government-owned banks or at a minimum made bank 
licensing subject to parliamentary approval. Many developing countries nationalized their 
banking system after independence to gain direct control over this critical part of the 
economy. Across the globe, government ownership has been widespread throughout the 
twentieth century and today is still dominant in some developing countries.64
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 In this context, 
it is important to distinguish between government ownership as long-term policy and as crisis 
resolution tool, as applied after the 2008 global financial crisis in many European countries. 
Government-owned banks have often been seen as critical in helping overcome market 
failures and funnel domestic savings to strategically important projects (Gerschenkron, 1962). 
On the other hand, government ownership can lead to inefficient allocation of scarce 
resources and political capture. These different views of government ownership relate 
64 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). 
 
directly to the public and private interest view on government’s involvement in the financial 
sector, as already discussed. 
A large empirical literature has shown that government ownership is inefficient. 
Government-owned and -managed banks run the risk of being captured by the ruling elite or 
special interest and have – on average - a miserable record in expanding access. Firms with 
political connections have easier access to state banks and receive larger loans but are less 
likely to repay.65
Privatization, however, is not a panacea, especially if undertaken in an institutionally 
weak environment, and can lead to capture by socioeconomic elites linked to political elites. 
Poorly designed and executed privatization processes can lead to fragility and banking crises, 
as numerous examples have shown over the past thirty years. Studies of privatization 
processes have shown the benefits of privatizing government-owned banks but also the 
pitfalls.
 On an aggregate level, government ownership of banks is associated with 
lower levels of financial development and lower rates of economic growth (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002). 
66
Beyond ownership, government intervention into the financial system can take many 
forms. Excessive reserve requirements, interest rate ceilings and floors, and credit quotas are 
some of the policies that collectively are referred to as financial repression (Fry, 1988). As 
shown mostly by country-level studies, some of them of qualitative rather than quantitative 
 One interesting case is Mexico, where privatization in 1988 was restricted to 
domestic shareholders, most of whom had no banking experience and borrowed money from 
their own banks to acquire the banks from the government. A subsequent boom-and-bust 
period led to new nationalization and recapitalization episode in the mid-1990s, after which 
most of the banks were sold to multinational banks. 
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nature, most of these policies have benefited the incumbent elite and enterprises connected to 
it, rather than marginal groups. Credit quotas and interest caps and floors have impeded the 
efficient allocation of society’s savings to its most productive uses and have especially hurt 
“smaller” depositors and borrowers. In case of binding ceilings, banks are prevented from 
charging adequate risk premiums for riskier and more opaque borrowers or from recovering 
fixed transaction costs through a mark-up on smaller loan amounts. Furthermore, competition 
between credit institutions and for more deposits is hampered as financial institutions have no 
incentives to become more efficient or to attract more deposits if they cannot finance more 
marginal customers. Similarly, given fixed transaction costs in financial intermediation, 
floors on deposit interest rates make savers with small transaction amounts unattractive for 
financial institutions. Credit quotas have resulted in fragmentation of credit markets and 
higher costs for nonpriority sectors. In many cases, financial institutions have found ways 
around these restrictions, but at high costs and with consequent efficiency losses. Such 
policies are especially strong in sectors that are considered marginalized or as politically 
critical, such as rural areas. 
The failure of many of these interventionist policies have led to a move toward more 
market-based financial systems over the past two decades, often associated with the 
Washington Consensus. Many developing countries have moved toward more stable banking 
systems, and some have experienced financial deepening. Expectations of more inclusive 
financial systems and more significant financial deepening have often not been achieved, 
however. Although this raises questions on the proper sequencing and implementation of 
reform policies to deepen and broaden financial systems, it has also led to a renewed debate 
on the role of government in the financial system, beyond institution building and providing 
the macroeconomic framework. Activist or market-enabling policies that try to overcome 
 
coordination and first mover problems in small financial systems with incomplete markets 
have been suggested, such as attempts to provide the necessary infrastructure to launch new 
financial products, such as factoring, or credit guarantee programs.67
One region where market-based financial sector reform has been successful is the 
transition economies of Central Europe. The challenge for these countries was to make banks 
independent from government and from their past links with state-owned enterprises, as the 
continuing relationships between banks and incumbent enterprises and the resulting fragility 
had severe macroeconomic repercussions. The need for recapitalization of banks resulted in 
rising fiscal deficits, monetary overhang, and thus inflation. The solution to this continuous 
cycle of repayment problems, accumulation of nonperforming assets, recapitalization, and 
inflation was the adoption of a disciplining tool to impose a hard budget constraint on 
enterprises and banks alike. Credibly committing to monetary stability in turn forced the 
necessary reforms in the financial sector to avoid future recapitalization. In many countries, 
banks were therefore not only privatized but sold to foreign banks, which helped sever the 




 What essentially was needed was a 
straightjacket that tied policy makers’ hands and prevented them from bailing out financial 
and nonfinancial institutions. 
4.3. Political Structure as Basic Factor for Financial Development 
How do some countries develop the necessary legal and regulatory structures to support 
market-based financial systems and others do not? Why do some countries have political 
structures that are conducive to financial development and property rights protection, more 
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broadly, and others do not? Here the literature on the historic roots of financial sector 
development overlaps with the literature on institutions and growth. 
The government’s position as party to (financial) contracts and arbiter of the same 
contracts creates a conflict of interest and make the political Coase theorem that distribution 
and efficiency can be determined independently break down (Acemoglu, 2003). A basic 
condition for thriving financial markets is thus constraints on political power and the 
protection of individual property rights from expropriation through both other private parties 
and the government. It is important to stress in that context that property rights must be for 
everyone, not just the elite. Autocratic regimes dislike independent and competitive financial 
systems because they are afraid they might finance opponents. On the other hand, the 
financial system can serve as source of rents for the ruling elite, as especially the case of 
resource-based economies has shown. Evidence from broad cross-country samples shows that 
countries with autocratic political regimes are more likely to have restrictive regulation and 
entry barriers into the banking systems (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006), whereas the most 
robust predictor of long-term financial development (as opposed to short-term boosts) is 
political accountability (Quintyn and Verdier, 2010), evidence that is consistent with historic 
analysis that shows for a panel of countries over the period 1880–1997 that more restrictions 
on political power and stable political regimes are more conducive to financial development 
(Bordo and Rousseau, 2006). Countries with captive political institutions also suffer more 
from financial instability (Acemoglu et al., 2003). The political environment is also important 
for the effectiveness of financial liberalization, which is more likely to produce instability in 
countries with captive political institutions (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2006). 
Historically, the financial centers of modern history in Europe developed in 
independent cities in northern Italy and, later in sixteenth century, the Netherlands, both areas 
 
where government was supported by broad parts of the population and with systems of 
checks and balances. The Glorious Revolution in seventeenth-century England secured 
property rights from government expropriation and reinforced the status of an independent 
judiciary. This enabled the British Crown to borrow at much lower interest rates in the 
international markets, as these institutions reassured investors of a low default risk (North and 
Weingast, 1989). 
There are two sets of theories—not necessarily exclusive—that explain the 
development of the necessary property rights and contractual institutions for financial 
development across the world. One set of theories sees historical events in Europe more than 
200 years ago as shaping the legal and regulatory frameworks across the globe today through 
their influence on political structures in these countries. Specifically, the legal origin theory 
sees political conflicts in England and France in the medieval age and during the Glorious 
and French Revolutions shaping the role and independence of judiciaries in these countries. 
Different points on the trade-off between centralized power to avoid civil unrest and freedom 
to allow economic activity in England and France during medieval times shaped the 
government’s approach to the judiciary, with France taking a much more centralized 
approach than England (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). Alternatively, one can consider the role 
of the judiciary during the Glorious Revolution, where the judges sided with the winning 
Parliament, and the French Revolution, where the judges were on the losing side. This 
resulted in a strengthening of the judiciary’s independence but also their role in lawmaking in 
England, while it reduced the judiciary to an executing role in France, with law- and rule-
making concentrated in legislature and executive. However, this also resulted in a different 
degree of flexibility and adaptability of the legal systems in England and France. England’s 
legal system was more adaptable due to a stronger role for jurisprudence and past decisions 
 
and the ability of judges to base decisions on principles of fairness and justice, whereas 
France’s legal system was more rigid, based on bright-line rules and little if any role for 
jurisprudence and previous decisions.69
Through the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century, the Napoleonic legal 
tradition was spread throughout continental Europe. Subsequently, legal traditions were 
spread throughout the rest of the world, mostly in the form of colonization, with the British 
common law tradition adopted in all British colonies and the Napoleonic civil code tradition 
transplanted to Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese, and French colonies. The legal structures 
originating in these different traditions have proven to be very persistent, especially in 
developing countries. Take the example of the Napoleonic legal tradition. First, while the 
European nations overcame the rigidities of the Napoleonic code, they exported its 
antagonism toward jurisprudence and its reliance on judicial formalism to minimize the role 
of judges. This comes with the tradition of avoiding open disputes about legal interpretation 
and the aversion against jurisprudence. Second, as the Napoleonic doctrine sees judges as 
purely executing civil servants, judges frequently “are at the bottom of the scale of prestige 
among the legal professions in France and in many nations that adopted the French 
Revolutionary reforms, and the best people in those nations accordingly seek other legal 
careers” (Merryman, 1996, p. 116). Third, and as a consequence of the previous point, there 
is a stronger reliance on bright-line laws to limit the role of the courts. Once a country adopts 
the bright-line approach to lawmaking, this can lead into a trap, as courts will not be 
challenged to develop legal procedures and methods to deal with new circumstances, thus 
retarding the development of efficiently adaptive legal systems (Pistor et al., 2002, 2003). 
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Empirical evidence has indeed shown that countries with a Napoleonic legal tradition 
have less independent judiciaries and less adaptable legal systems.70
An alternative explanation refers not to the identity of the colonizing power but the 
mode of colonization. Distinguishing between settler and extractive colonies, Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) show that the former developed stronger property rights 
protection than the latter, given the political and societal structures that natural resource 
extraction in the latter implied. The initial colonization mode, in turn, was determined by the 
disease environment that European colonizers encountered as well as the incidence of native 
population in the colonized areas. Areas with more hostile disease environments and/or large 
native population concentrations were more likely to be settled in an extractive mode. The 
political structures developed during the colonization period endured after independence, 
therefore also making the weak property rights and contract enforcement institutions 
persistently weak beyond independence. 
 Important in the context 
of this paper, countries with a Napoleonic legal tradition have—on average—weaker property 
rights protection and contractual institutions that are less conducive to external finance, 
including weaker protection for minority shareholders and secured and unsecured creditors. 
Enforcement of contracts is more costly and slower in civil code countries as is the 
registration of property and collateral. This has the overall effect of smaller and less effective 
financial markets in civil code countries (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2003a). 
Empirical evidence shows the importance of the colonization mode for the 
development of financial markets today (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2003a). 
Countries that were initially colonized in an extractive mode have less developed financial 
markets today. This effect is in addition to the effect of the legal tradition already discussed. 
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Beyond the colonization experience, the legal tradition and endowment views show 
the importance of political structures and persistence in financial system development. These 
hypotheses suggest that changes in the legal institutions that underpin thriving financial 
markets are only possible under outside pressure or exogenous shocks, such as new 
technologies, diseases, or globalization. Similarly, changes in financial sector policies are 
more likely under exogenous pressure. I already discussed the example of the Central 
European transition economies where banking crises and pressure to establish 
macroeconomic stability forced privatization of banks to foreign banks. Similarly, in Brazil 
the introduction of the Real Plan in 1994 that terminated the long-running inflationary 
tradition prevented the government from bailing out banks owned by individual states, as it 
had done several times earlier, and thus forced a complete restructuring of these institutions 
(Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill, 2005). In Argentina, the establishment of a currency board 
in 1991 started the restructuring process of provincial banks (Clarke and Cull, 2002). 
Technological innovation was critical in driving branch deregulation in the United States in 
the 1970s and 1980s. As shown by Kroszner and Strahan (1999), the invention of automatic 
teller machines (ATMs), in conjunction with court rulings that ATMs are not bank branches, 
weakened the geographical bond between customers and banks, and improvements in 
communications technology lowered the costs of using distant banks. These innovations 
reduced the monopoly power of local banks, weakening their ability and desire to fight 
against deregulation, ultimately leading to branch deregulation. The timing of this 
deregulation across states, in turn, was very much a function of initial conditions, ranging 





This paper surveyed three related strands of the literature—finance and growth, financial 
fragility, and finance and politics. The three literatures are closely linked to each other. The 
growth benefits of financial sector deepening and the fragility of banking are two sides of the 
same mechanism—maturity transformation. While overcoming agency problems between 
investors and entrepreneurs is an important growth-enhancing role of financial institutions 
and markets, agency problems between financial institutions and their depositors are the basis 
for possible financial fragility. Empirically, long-term financial deepening is related to faster 
economic growth, and short-term credit booms are related to a higher probability of systemic 
banking distress. Underlying both growth and fragility are political constraints, often related 
to historic conditions, that prevent the necessary property rights and contractual institutions to 
develop and might foster connected and politicized lending. 
Throughout the paper I discussed the linkages between the three strands of literature. 
One example—already referred to—are the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, which experienced rapid financial deepening over the past twenty years, in line with 
the transition to market-based economies. The deepening was stronger where the underlying 
political institutions allowed for checks and balances, property rights protection, and 
conducive contractual institutions. However, in some countries financial deepening turned 
into a household and mortgage credit boom, ultimately increasing fragility and ending in a 
bust during the recent global financial crisis. 
The current crisis, especially the development of financial markets in the United 
States, also offers an interesting background on which to bring together the three themes of 
this paper. First, as discussed, financial liberalization in the 1970s and ’80s has helped deepen 
the financial system, with positive repercussions for growth and smoothing volatility. 
 
Financial liberalization, however, has also created the basis for a boom-and-bust cycle, with 
banks taking increasing risks. There has also been evidence for a herding effect with financial 
institutions taking increasingly risks in the same sectoral and geographical portfolios. Behind 
the rapid growth of the subprime mortgage segment, there was a political focus on home 
ownership for low-income Americans. As laid out convincingly by Rajan (2010), in the 
absence of easy solutions to reduce income inequality, there was a political focus on reducing 
consumption inequality, which included boosting access to credit. Government policies such 
as the Community Reinvestment Act and guarantees provided by government-sponsored 
financial institutions, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, created incentives to look beyond 
the usual risk-return trade-off. However, there were also important regulatory distortions, as 
described by Levine (2010, 2011). But maybe one of the decisive incentives was provided by 
the Bernanke-Greenspan put—the expectation of financial market participants to be bailed 
out by the U.S. authorities in case of distress, be it through monetary policy or more direct 
intervention. 
What effect does the current crisis have on our thinking about the financial sector and 
its role in the economy? The picture of the financial system as an unconditionally growth-
enhancing sector has been tarnished. Excesses have become clear, as also obvious from wage 
trends in the financial sector, documented by Phillipon and Reshef (2009). In the United 
States, wages in the financial sector relative to general wage levels have increased 
substantially during the recent boom period, to a comparable extent as in the 1920s in the 
period leading up to the Great Depression. Most critically, the current crisis should return the 
debate on financial sector development to the benefits of financial services and, more 
specifically, financial intermediation. 
 
Although academics refer mostly to the intermediation functions of financial systems 
and thus to a facilitating role of the financial sector, practitioners and policy makers often 
view financial services as a growth sector in itself. This view toward the financial sector sees 
it more or less as an export sector, that is, one that seeks to build an often nationally centered 
financial stronghold by building on relative comparative advantages, such as skill base, 
favorable regulatory policies, subsidies, and so on. Economic benefits discussed often point 
at important spin-offs coming from professional services (legal, accounting, consulting, etc.) 
that typically cluster around a financial center. Reconciling these different views will be a 
challenge going forward. 
For better or worse, the financial sector is an integral part of modern market 
economies. Well-functioning and sound financial institutions and markets underpin the 
smooth exchange of services and goods and foster long-term investment and thus growth. 
Aggressive risk taking and distortions can lead to systemic distress and economic crises. It is 
important, however, to not throw out the baby with the very dirty bathwater, but to focus on 
the necessary regulatory and supervisory frameworks for sound and effective financial 
systems. Similarly, a better understanding of the political economy of financial sector policies 
is important. An increasing governance focus is important—not only for central banks and 
regulatory authorities but also for financial institutions and their relationships with political 
and regulatory authorities. 
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